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451 
OVERCOMING TEXT IN AN AGE OF 
TEXTUALISM: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO 
ARGUING CASES OF STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
Robert J. Gregory1 
As law students, we encounter the law largely through cases.  We 
learn that cases establish legal rules and that these rules develop organi-
cally through a process of case-by-case adjudication.  As practitioners, 
the law often appears in a much different form.  Yes, cases play an im-
portant role in law development but, more often than not, the legal rule 
that affects our client’s interest has its origins, not in the decision of a 
court, but in an existing statute, ordinance, or regulation.  Our job as 
lawyers is to make sense out of the positive law by employing the tools 
of statutory interpretation. 
The practitioner’s task, when confronted with a governing statute, 
is not an easy one.  Statutes are often ambiguous.  The rules of statutory 
construction, ostensibly created to resolve statutory ambiguity, are, in 
many cases, less than elucidating.  It has been five decades since Karl 
Llewellyn authored his famous article on the canons of statutory con-
struction, demonstrating a fundamental truth about the process of statu-
tory interpretation: that for every canon of construction leading to one 
result, there is a corresponding canon, of seemingly equal weight, lead-
ing to the opposite result.2  Llewellyn’s article typifies the legal realist 
position, which views the process of statutory interpretation, as practiced 
by courts, as the embodiment of result-oriented jurisprudence. 
There is some truth in the realist critique, as anyone who has seen 
action in the trenches of statutory disputes can attest.  Most battles of 
                                                          
 1. Mr. Gregory is a senior attorney in the Office of General Counsel, U.S. Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission.  This Article was written in the author’s private capacity.  No offi-
cial support or endorsement by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or any other 
agency of the United States government is intended or should be inferred. 
 2. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons 
About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950). 
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statutory interpretation play out like a fixed game of cards.  One party 
invokes the canon of statutory construction most supportive of its posi-
tion.  The other party invokes a contrary canon of statutory interpretation 
supportive of its position.  Sometimes, the parties invoke the same can-
on, quarreling over who may rightly claim the mantle of the  preferred 
canon (a frequent occurrence with the plain language rule, the most val-
ued of the statutory canons).  The court holds the ultimate trump card.  If 
the court desires to reach the result sought by party A, it relies upon the 
canon invoked by that party.  If the court desires to reach the result 
sought by party B, it relies upon the canon invoked by that party.  Rarely 
is one firmly convinced that this process yields a result that is the prod-
uct of neutral principles.  More than likely, this process leaves an im-
pression of a result in search of a supporting principle. 
Although this feature of the interpretative process complicates the 
life of the practitioner, there are ways in which the practitioner can make 
sense out of the interpretative quagmire.  Legal realists are undoubtedly 
correct that there exists a certain deal of gamesmanship and manipula-
tion in the use of canons of statutory construction.  Yet, there is an im-
portant point that may be lost in the realist critique.  Over time, seeming-
ly contrary canons of construction emerge, each claiming at least some 
support in case law.  In particular eras, however, certain canons tend to 
predominate over others.  In one era, canon A may reign supreme.  In 
another era, canon B, A’s opposite, may emerge as predominant.  With-
out discounting the views of the realists, it may be argued that the prin-
ciples of statutory interpretation influence the outcome.  The key is to 
know, at any particular point in time, which set of interpretative princi-
ples carry the favor of the courts. 
For most of this century, the prevailing view of statutory interpreta-
tion was one that denied the primacy of the bare text.  The leading lumi-
naries of twentieth century American jurisprudence—Holmes, Cardozo, 
and Hand among others—disparaged what they perceived as an overly 
technical reliance on the written word.3  They believed in an “archaeo-
logical” approach that dug beneath the text in its search for legislative 
meaning.4  The goal of statutory interpretation was to discern the under-
                                                          
 3. Learned Hand, for example, wrote that it was “not enough for the judge just to use a dic-
tionary.  If he should do no more, he might come out with a result which every sensible man would 
recognize to be quite the opposite of what was really intended; which would contradict or leave un-
fulfilled its plain purpose.”  LEARNED HAND, How Far Is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision? in 
THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 103, 106 (I. Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960). 
 4. Professor Aleinikoff has used the “archeological metaphor,” referring to 
“[i]ntentionalism” as the “second major archeological strategy,” one that “locates statutory law be-
yond, or behind, the statutory language.”  T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Patterson v. McLean: Updating 
2
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lying intent of the legislature; an intent that was often more clearly re-
vealed by purpose and context rather than naked text. 
An approach that emphasizes statutory purpose, at the expense of 
the bare text, tends to favor those canons that permit a more flexible ap-
proach to statutory interpretation.  Two canons cited in the Llewellyn ar-
ticle illustrate this point.  Llewellyn cites, as one canon, the oft-cited rule 
that “[e]very word and clause [of a statute] must be given effect.”5  He 
cites as its opposite the rule that, if “[a word or clause] is inadvertently 
inserted or repugnant to the rest of the statute, [the word or clause] may 
be rejected as surplusage.”6  In an era that emphasizes the search for the 
underlying “intent,” with text being one of many competing indicia of 
that intent, the prevailing canon in this case is likely to be the latter can-
on because it permits rejection of the incongruous text as mere surplus-
age. 
In recent years, the interpretative paradigm has moved, quite dra-
matically, in a different direction.  The search for a more elusive statuto-
ry “purpose” or “intent” has given way to a strong emphasis on text; new 
textualism, as one leading commentator has described it.”7  The precise 
contours of this new textualism are debatable, but without a doubt, it has 
changed the rules of the game.  Text, once a mere player in the broader 
search for legislative meaning, has now taken center stage—framed by 
its champions as the end of the statutory inquiry itself, rather than a sub-
servient means to some other end.  Arguments rooted in non-textual con-
siderations, if not totally eviscerated, are not held in favor by the courts. 
There has been a good deal of academic criticism relating to the 
new textual hegemony in statutory interpretation.8  For the practitioner, 
however, the issue is more concrete.  The practitioner may say, “I have a 
                                                          
Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 22-23 (1988). 
 5. Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 404. 
 6. Id. 
 7. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 621 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter New Textualism]; see also Bernard W. Bell, R-E-S-P-E-C-T: Respecting Legislative Judgments 
in Interpretive Theory, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1254 (2000) (using the new textualism terminology). 
 8. E.g., Bell, supra note 7, at 1261 (“Jurists who adopt new textualism purely for instrumen-
tal reasons impose severe societal costs by frustrating majority rule and denigrating the traditional 
role of courts in dispute resolution.”); Eskridge, supra note 7, at 683 (“Perhaps the biggest problem 
with Justice Scalia’s new textualism is that it seems unfriendly to democratically achieved legisla-
tion and threatens to undo much of Congress’ statutory work.”); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling 
Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United 
States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 306-07 (1990) (criticizing the new textualists for 
ignoring legislative history); Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 55-56 (the “new plain meaning” can “never 
be an adequate theory of interpretation” because it “is not interested in searching for a sensible read-
ing of a statute, one that would seek either to further the project begun by the enacting legislature or 
to weave the statute into the warp and woof of the legal system”) (citations omitted). 
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case involving the interpretation of a statute.  I want to argue that the 
statute means X.  X is not clearly supported by the naked text.  How do I 
construct an argument, consistent with textual primacy, that achieves my 
desired result?” 
This Article attempts to provide the practitioner with an answer to 
this question.  First, the Article describes the historic movement from 
purpose to text in the interpretation of statutes.  In doing so, the Article 
notes a critical feature of textualism as currently configured—that it 
permits some flexibility (more than many people realize) in the interpre-
tation of statutes.  The Article next discusses the impact of the textual 
movement on the process of arguing cases of statutory interpretation.  In 
particular, the Article sets forth three possible options available to the 
practitioner when confronted with a statutory provision that does not, by 
its naked terms, support the result sought by the practitioner.  The prima-
ry goal is to suggest ways in which a practitioner can successfully argue, 
within the textualist framework, for a result that is not, strictly speaking, 
dictated by the naked text.  Stated differently (and more candidly), the 
Article seeks to assist the practitioner in using the rhetoric of textualism 
to achieve a result that is textualist in form, if not in substance.  Finally, 
the Article roots this discussion in two real-world cases.  It first analyzes 
a recent Supreme Court decision that provides a model for the way in 
which a party may use text-based arguments to achieve a result that 
might be viewed as contra-textual.  The Article then puts that model to 
use in the context of another real-world example of statutory interpreta-
tion, yet unresolved. 
I.  A LITTLE BACKGROUND PLEASE 
Statutes are given life in two stages.  First and foremost, they are 
created by legislative bodies.  Second, they are construed and applied by 
courts (or, in some cases, executive branch agencies responsible for their 
enforcement).  The practicing lawyer typically operates at the second 
stage.  The lawyer has a client.  The client’s interests are potentially af-
fected by a statute.  The lawyer, on behalf of his or her client, seeks to 
persuade a court to interpret the statute in a way that favors the client’s 
interests. 
The basic points surrounding the process of statutory interpretation 
are not disputed.  The legislature reigns supreme in the area of lawmak-
ing.  The legislature is comprised of elected officials.  These officials are 
responsible for determining statutory policy.  At the federal level, the 
lawmaking function has a constitutional dimension.  Only Congress is 
4
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given lawmaking powers.9  In carrying out those powers, Congress must 
follow carefully prescribed procedures that require, among other things, 
a majority vote in both Houses of Congress.10 
Because lawmaking powers lie largely with the legislature, the role 
of the judiciary is a subservient one.  Courts do not possess formal law-
making powers of their own.11  They simply interpret and apply the laws 
passed by legislatures.  Because a court must give effect to the positive 
law, it may not simply cast aside the legislative judgment and replace it 
with a policy deemed more desirable. 
Although courts play a subordinate role in the lawmaking process, 
it is obvious to any keen observer that this role is far from ministerial.  
Statutes are often ambiguous or vague.12  This ambiguity is sometimes 
inadvertent, the result of an oversight, a poorly chosen word, or a mis-
placed comma.  In other cases, Congress deliberately avoids clarity in 
order to secure enactment of legislation, writing at that level of specifici-
ty (or generality) where consensus is possible.  In either case, the task of 
interpreting or applying a statute involves some element of discretion.  
The court’s job is to assign meaning to the words of the statute.  But 
how exactly does a court arrive at the proper meaning of a statute?  Does 
it look only at the words of the statute? Is it free to consult legislative 
history?  Should it rely more on the naked text or the statute’s objective 
or purpose? 
For a good part of the twentieth century, the predominant view of 
statutory interpretation emphasized the statute’s purpose more so than 
literal textual meaning.  The chief proponents of this purpose-oriented 
approach were Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, the leading authorities of 
their day on issues of statutory interpretation.13  The Hart and Sacks ap-
proach was based on the premise “that every statute and doctrine of un-
written law, developed by the decisional process, has some kind of pur-
pose or objective.  This approach applies even though it may be difficult, 
                                                          
 9. See  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 10. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 11. Of course, in deciding specific cases, courts do have the power to fashion common law 
principles.  See Harry W. Jones, Our Uncommon Common Law, 42 TENN. L. REV. 443 (1975).  
Those principles, however, exist only in the absence of a legislative mandate to the contrary.  Swift 
v. Philadelphia & R.R., 64 F. 59, 63 (N.D. Ill. 1894). 
 12. In some circumstances, a statute is so vague that a court “is impliedly invited, and indeed 
compelled, to supplement it with more specific rules.”  REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION 
AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 238-39 (1975). 
 13. For a discussion of the historic influence of the Hart and Sacks approach, see Aleinikoff, 
supra note 4, at 26-28 (noting that Hart and Sacks “produced the most sustained intentionalist ar-
gument” and for years “dominated the interpretive scene”). 
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on occasion, to ascertain or to agree exactly how it should be phrased.”14  
Hart and Sacks invited an interpreter to “identify the broader purposes 
embodied in the legislation and answer the interpretive question in a 
manner consistent with those purposes.”15  The statutory text was rele-
vant to the interpretive inquiry because “the words by which the legisla-
ture chose to express its intent” provided persuasive evidence of the pur-
pose of a statute.”16  However, the bare text was not controlling.  
“Literal interpretation dogma” was to be distrusted,17 because it could 
lead to a result which every sensible man would recognize to be the op-
posite of what the legislature intended.”18 
Many of the great legal minds of the early-to-mid twentieth century 
favored the purpose-oriented approach that Hart and Sacks reflected in 
their writing.  Justice Holmes believed that a court’s job was to give ef-
fect to the “will” of the legislature, irrespective of whether that will was 
found in the “terms” of the statute itself.19  Justice Holmes characterized 
the plain meaning rule as “an axiom of experience [rather] than a rule of 
law,” urging that courts were free to depart from the plain meaning of a 
statute where there was “persuasive” evidence of a contrary intent.20  
Justice Holmes cautioned against treating the literal word as “crystal, 
transparent and unchanged.”21  Justice Cardozo shared the view that a 
judge’s job was not merely “to match the colors of the case at hand 
against the colors of many sample cases spread out upon [his] desk.”22  
The judge’s involvement begins “when the colors do not match—when 
the references in the index fail” and at this point, a judge must fashion 
                                                          
 14. Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 34 (citing HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL 
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 166 (tentative ed. 1958)). 
 15. Id. at 24. 
 16. United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940). 
 17. Id. 
 18. HAND, supra note 3, at 106. 
 19. Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908). 
 20. Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928). 
 21. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).  Holmes also made the comment, oft-quoted 
by the textualists, that, in construing statutes, courts “do not inquire what the legislature meant; 
[they] ask only what the statute means.”  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Theory of Legal Interpre-
tation, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 203, 207 (1920).  But Holmes was no literalist.  He  under-
stood the importance of context and was more than willing, in appropriate cases, to look beyond the 
naked test in determining what the “statute means.”  See, e.g., Johnson, 163 F. at 32 
“The major premise of the conclusion expressed in a statute, the change of policy that induces the 
enactment, may not be set out in terms, but it is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to say: 
We see what you are driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as before”. 
Id. 
 22. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 20-21 (1921). 
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law for the litigants before him, “acting within a statute’s interstices.”23  
Finally, Judge Hand was a frequent critic of courts that made “a fortress 
out of the dictionary.”24  Judge Hand believed that literalism risked 
“pervert[ing]” a statute by “contradict[ing] or leav[ing] unfulfilled its 
plain purpose.”25  In Judge Hand’s view, “statutes always [had] some 
purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative 
discovery [was] the surest guide to their meaning.”26 
In an era where purpose reigned supreme, the practitioner’s job was 
to make sense of the statute.  This included offering interpretations that 
flowed, not from a grammarian’s parsing of the literal text, but from the 
broader purposes of the statute and the surrounding legal context.  Hy-
per-technical exercises in textual exegesis were not favored.  Those can-
ons calling for a flexible approach to statutory interpretation trumped 
those insisting upon strict adherence to textual niceties or linguistic con-
ventions.  Remedial statutes were to be liberally construed; rules of 
grammar were to be disregarded where strict adherence to such rules 
would defeat the statutory purpose; courts were empowered to give ef-
fect to the manifest purpose of a statute even in the face of seemingly 
unambiguous statutory language. 
An example of the purpose-oriented approach in operation is pro-
vided by NLRB v. Scrivener,27  a 1972 Supreme Court decision.  Scrive-
ner involved a claim of unlawful retaliation under the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA).  The NLRA’s anti-retaliation provision made it 
unlawful “for an employer to discharge or otherwise discriminate against 
an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under the 
Act.”28  The claimants in Scrivener were dismissed from their jobs after 
they gave sworn statements to the National Labor Relations Board, as 
part of an investigation by the Board.  The question before the Court was 
whether the protections of the anti-retaliation provision extended to an 
employer’s reprisal of an employee for giving testimony at a formal 
hearing.29  If not, it would place claimants, who merely gave sworn 
statements to the Board, outside the protections of the statute. 
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the NLRA’s reference to an 
employee who “has filed charges or given testimony” could be read 
                                                          
 23. Id. at 20-21, 129. 
 24. Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945), aff’d, 326 U.S. 404 (1945). 
 25. HAND, supra note 3, at 106. 
 26. Cabell, 148 F.2d at 739. 
 27. 405 U.S. 117 (1972). 
 28. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1968). 
 29. Scrivener, 405 U.S. at 121. 
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strictly and its reach confined to formal charges and formal testimony.”30  
The Court also noted that the NLRA’s anti-retaliation provision had its 
origins in a provision of the National Industry Recover Act, which, in 
contrast to the NLRA, specifically referenced the giving of evidence 
“with respect to an alleged violation.”31  Nevertheless, the Court broadly 
interpreted the anti-retaliation provision as protecting the employee dur-
ing the investigative stage not only protecting an employee in connection 
with the filing of a formal charge or the giving of formal testimony.32  
The Court ruled that this interpretation comports with the objective of 
that section “to prevent the Board’s channels of information from drying 
up by employer intimidation of prospective complainants and witness-
es.”33  The Court also stated that its interpretation squares with the prac-
ticalities of appropriate agency action,” under which “[a]n employee 
who participates in a Board investigation may not be called formally to 
testify or may be discharged before any hearing at which he could testi-
fy.”34  Finally, the Court stressed that the approach to the NLRA’s anti-
retaliation provision generally has been a liberal one in order to fully ef-
fectuate the section’s remedial purpose.”35 
There is much to commend in the purpose-oriented approach, as 
applied in a case such as Scrivener.  It is clear that by enacting the 
NLRA’s anti-retaliation provision Congress sought to protect individuals 
who assist the Board in investigating potentially illegal conduct.  It 
makes little sense “to protect the employee because he participate[d] in 
the formal inception of the process (by filing a charge) or in the final, 
formal presentation, but not to protect his participation in the important 
developmental stages that fall between these two points in time.”36  A 
pure textualist might object to the expansion of the statute beyond its lit-
eral terms, as strictly construed.  However, it is entirely reasonable to 
read the anti-retaliation provision as protecting an employee who is fired 
for giving sworn testimony to the Board. 
The objection to the purpose-oriented approach is not rooted in cas-
es such as Scrivener.  It is rooted in cases where, under the rubric of 
statutory purpose, judges adopt an interpretation that reflects their own 
views rather than those of the enacting legislature.  A decision that is of-
                                                          
 30. Id. at 122. 
 31. Id. at 123. 
 32. Id. at 121. 
 33. Id. at 121-22 (quoting John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 483, 485 
(1951)). 
 34. Id. at 123. 
 35. Scrivener, 405 U.S. at 124. 
 36. Id. 
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ten cited as an example of the purpose-oriented approach run amok is 
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber.37  In Weber, the Supreme Court 
held that the prohibition against racial discrimination in Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not condemn all private, race-conscious af-
firmative action plans.  The Court reached this conclusion despite the 
fact that Title VII, by its plain terms, prohibited an employer from dis-
criminating against “any individual . . . because of such individual’s 
race.”38  The Court reached this conclusion despite compelling indica-
tions in the legislative history that the enacting Congress intended to 
prohibit, not endorse, preferential treatment for members of a protected 
group.39  The Court rested its decision on what it described as the “spir-
it” of the statute.40  The objective evidence of this “spirit” was thin.  In 
fact, almost every indicia of congressional intent pointed to a “color-
blind” paradigm where any form of race-based discrimination was im-
proper.  Under a dynamic approach to statutory interpretation, one could 
defend the result in Weber, based on intervening “practical and equita-
ble” considerations and a changing legal context.41  The Court’s inter-
pretation, purportedly drawn from its reading of the original statutory 
purpose, was questionable. 
As it turned out, Weber marked the end of an era.  Beginning in the 
early 1980’s, Ronald Reagan began appointing self-described “strict 
constructionists” to the federal bench.  Many of these judges took a di-
rect aim at cases such as Weber and at the interpretive method that pro-
duced them.  One of those judges, Justice Scalia, quickly moved to the 
forefront of the conservative critics.  Justice Scalia embarked on a cam-
paign to discredit the purpose-oriented approach to statutory interpreta-
tion.42  Justice Scalia insisted upon a return to literalism as he argued 
against the use of legislative history, which he viewed as extra-
                                                          
 37. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
 38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1979). 
 39. Weber, 443 U.S. at 231-55. 
 40. Id. at 201. 
 41. Id. at 209-10 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic 
Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1480 (1987) (arguing that, because “the legal and 
constitutional context of the statute may change” over time, an interpreter should “ask her self not 
only what the legislation means abstractly, or even on the basis of legislative history, but also what 
it ought to mean in terms of the needs and goals of our present day society”) [hereinafter Statutory 
Interpretation]. 
 42. See Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 7, at 650-56 (discussing Justice Scalia’s role as 
an aggressive critic of the “traditional approach” to statutory interpretation).  Justice Scalia mounted 
a similar campaign against non-textualist approaches to the interpretation of the United States Con-
stitution.  See Jeffrey Rosen, Originalist Sin: The Achievement of Antonin Scalia, and Its Intellectu-
al Incoherence, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 5, 1997. 
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constitutional and subject to manipulation by legislators and their com-
mittee staffs.43  The result of these efforts was a shift to a new interpre-
tive methodology—what some have described as a new textualism.”44 
The new textualism rests on the premise that “the constitutionally-
mandated role of the Court is to interpret laws’ using the actual statutory 
language, rather than [to] reconstruct legislators’ intentions.”45  From 
that premise, new textualism lays down several basic principles: (1) The 
text is not merely a means to an end—an aid, if you will, in ascertaining 
congressional intent.  Instead, it is the end itself.  (2) Only the text is the 
law; only the text represents the congressional will as expressed through 
the constitutionally-prescribed procedures for lawmaking.  (3) Ambigui-
ties in the text should not be lightly inferred.  Where they do exist, they 
should be resolved, if at all possible, by applying the objective canons of 
construction, particularly those that operate within the four corners of 
the text.  (4) Legislative history can never trump the plain text and 
should not be used to resolve statutory ambiguity, except when the statu-
tory language is hopelessly ambiguous or unclear.46 
A case that illustrates the new textualism in operation is West Vir-
ginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey.47  Casey involved a claim for 
expert witness fees under 42 U.SC. § 1988, a federal civil rights statute.  
This statute authorized an award of reasonable attorney’s fee as “part of 
the costs.”48  In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court held 
that this statute did not authorize an award of expert fees.  The Court 
noted that the statute, by its literal terms, did not reference expert fees.  
The Court also found that the record of statutory usage convincingly 
demonstrates that “attorney’s fees and expert fees are regarded as sepa-
rate elements of litigation cost.”49  The Court cited numerous federal 
                                                          
 43. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97-100 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (discuss-
ing the ways in which committee reports and floor statements can be manipulated by those unable to 
secure consensus for their positions). 
 44. E.g., Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 7. 
 45. Id. at 653 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., con-
curring)). 
 46. As one commentator has noted, “most of the new textualists will consider legislative his-
tory if the other aids still leave the statutory meaning truly unclear.”  Eskridge, New Textualism, 
supra note 7, at 669.; But see Bell, supra note 7, at 1264-65 (stating that new textualists argue that 
“only statutory text should create legal obligations and that legislative history does not provide a 
legitimate source of legal obligations”). 
 47. 499 U.S. 83 (1991). 
 48. The statute has since been amended to make explicitly clear that a court, “in its discretion, 
may include expert fees as part of the attorney’s fee.”  42 U.S.C. § 1988(c) (1994).  The amendment 
was passed in response to the Casey decision, as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 
102-166, § 113, 105 Stat. 1074, 1079 (1992). 
 49. Casey, 499 U.S. at 88. 
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statutes that, in contrast to Section 1988, expressly provided for an 
award of expert witness fees.50  The Court rejected the argument that 
“the congressional purpose in enacting [Section] 1988 must prevail over 
the ordinary meaning of the statutory terms.”  It states that “the best evi-
dence of that purpose is [that] the statutory text was adopted by both 
Houses of Congress and [subsequently] submitted to the President.”51  
The Court then dismissed the argument that the Court’s interpretation 
should be “guided by the ‘broad remedial purposes’” of Section 1988.52  
Finally, the Court took aim at the contention that “even if Congress 
plainly did not include expert fees in the fee-shifting provisions of [Sec-
tion] 1988, it would have done so had it thought about it.”53  On this 
point, the Court offered the following: 
This argument profoundly mistakes our role.  Where a statutory term 
presented to us for the first time is ambiguous, we construe it to con-
tain that permissible meaning which fits most logically and comforta-
bly into the body of both previously and subsequently enacted law.  
We do not do so because that precise accommodative meaning is what 
the lawmakers must have had in mind (how could an earlier Congress 
know what a later Congress would enact?), but because it is our role to 
make sense rather than nonsense out of the corpus juris.  But where, as 
here, the meaning of the term prevents such accommodation, it is not 
our function to eliminate clearly expressed inconsistency of policy and 
to treat alike subjects that different Congresses have chosen to treat 
differently.  The facile attribution of congressional ‘forgetfulness’ can-
not justify such a usurpation.  Where what is at issue is not a contradic-
tory disposition within the same enactment, but merely a difference be-
tween the more parsimonious policy of an earlier enactment and the 
more generous policy of a later one, there is no more basis for saying 
that the earlier Congress forgot than for saying that the earlier Con-
gress felt differently.  In such circumstances, the attribution of forget-
fulness rests in reality upon the judge’s assessment that the later statute 
contains the better disposition.  But that is not for judges to prescribe.54 
In his dissent, Justice Stevens charged the majority with “put[ting] 
                                                          
 50. Id. at 89 n.4 (citing, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A) (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h)(1) (1994); 
42 U.S.C. § 9659(f) (1994); 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(5) (1994)). 
 51. Id. at 98. 
 52. Id. at 99. 
 53. Id. at 100.  As the Court acknowledged this contention had carried the day in at least one 
circuit court.  See Friedrich v. Chicago, 888 F.2d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 1989), vacated 499 U.S. 933 
(1991) (awarding expert fees under Section 1988 because a court should “complete . . . the statute 
by reading it to bring about the end that the legislators would have specified had they thought about 
it more clearly”). 
 54. Casey, 499 U.S. at 100-01 (citation omitted). 
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on its thick grammarian’s spectacles and ignor[ing] the available evi-
dence of congressional purpose.”55  Justice Stevens opined that, “exclud-
ing expert witness fees from the reach of Section 1988 was both arbi-
trary and contrary to the broad remedial purpose that inspired the fee-
shifting provision of [Section] 1988.”56  It was arbitrary because the 
term “reasonable attorney’s fee,” as used in Section 1988, permitted re-
imbursement for such items as paralegal and law clerk fees, attorney’s 
travel expenses, and long-distance telephone calls, even though they are 
not literally part of an ‘attorney’s fee,’ or part of ‘costs’ [as that term is 
defined].”57  According to Justice Stevens, the majority opinion was 
contrary to the congressional purpose because the legislative history and 
historic context indicated that Congress enacted Section 1988 with the 
intent of allowing courts to shift fees, including expert witness fees.  It 
also intended to “make those who acted as private Attorneys General 
whole again, thus encouraging the enforcement of the civil rights 
laws.”58 In Justice Stevens’ view, “[t]he fact that Congress has consist-
ently provided for the inclusion of expert witness fees in fee-shifting 
statutes when it considered the matter is a weak reed on which to rest the 
conclusion that the omission of such a provision represents a deliberate 
decision to forbid such awards.”59  Justice Stevens concluded with the 
following statement, plainly intended as a rebuttal to the interpretive 
methodology employed in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion: 
In the domain of statutory interpretation, Congress is the master.  It 
obviously has the power to correct our mistakes, but we do the country 
a disservice when we needlessly ignore persuasive evidence of Con-
gress’ actual purpose and require it ‘to take time to revisit the matter’ 
and to restate its purpose in more precise English whenever its work 
product suffers from an omission or inadvertent error. . . . The Court 
concludes its opinion with the suggestion that disagreement with its 
textual analysis could only be based on the dissenters’ preference for a 
‘better’ statute.  It overlooks the possibility that a different view may 
be more faithful to Congress’ command.60 
Casey marked the ascendance of one paradigm of statutory inter-
                                                          
 55. Id. at 113 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 102 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (agreeing 
with Justice Stevens that the majority had “[u]sed the implements of literalism to wound, rather than 
to minister to, Congressional intent”). 
 56. Id. at 107-08. 
 57. Id. at 107. 
 58. Id. at 109-11 (citing, e.g., S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 4 n.3 (1976); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, 
p.1 (1976)). 
 59. Casey, 499 U.S. at 115-16. 
 60. Id. at 115. 
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pretation and the denouncement of another.  Justice Scalia, the new tex-
tualist, carried the day by insisting upon strict adherence to the statute’s 
literal terms, looking outside the statute only for the purpose of drawing 
a contrast between the text of the statute in question and that of other 
federal statutes.  Justice Stevens, the traditionalist, invoked, in a losing 
cause, the rhetoric of the purpose-oriented approach, referencing the 
views of Judge Hand and Justice Cardozo;61 views that may very well 
have carried the day only a decade or so before.62  In 1989, the time of 
the Casey decision, Justice Stevens could plausibly claim that in “recent 
years the Court has vacillated between a purely literal approach to the 
task of statutory interpretation and an approach that seeks guidance from 
historical context, legislative history, and prior cases identifying the pur-
pose that motivated the legislation.”63  Since Casey, the “vacillation” has 
been replaced by the steady drumbeat of textualism. 
Those of us who practice under the new textualist regime are well 
aware of its practical consequences.  Arguments based on legislative his-
tory are held in contempt, at least where the history is cited as the prima-
ry source of legislative meaning.Arguments based on a statute’s remedi-
al purpose are held in even less regard.  The interpretive canons, 
particularly those that seek to resolve ambiguity within the four corners 
of the statute or by reference to the language of analogous statutes, are 
strongly favored.  If a party treats the text lightly, it does so at its peril. 
Despite these developments, it would be a mistake to assume that 
the new textualism has squeezed all flexibility out of statutory interpreta-
tion.  First, even the most ardent textualists acknowledge that there are 
cases, rare as they may be, where a court is entitled to depart from the 
ordinary meaning of the statutory text.  These situations arise when the 
effect of implementing the ordinary meaning would be “patently absurd” 
or the result would be demonstrably at odds with the intention of its 
drafters.”64  Justice Scalia has acknowledged that there may be a 
                                                          
 61. Id. at 115-16 & n.19. 
 62. In his dissent, Justice Stevens cited several prior Supreme Court cases in which the Court 
had “eschewed the literal approach.”  Id. at 112 & n.11.  One of the cases cited was United States 
Steelworkers of America v. Weber.  United States Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 
(1979).  Justice Stevens acknowledged that the dissenters in Weber “had the better textual argu-
ment” but urged that the Court had “opted for a reading that took into account congressional pur-
pose and historical context.”  Id. at 112 n.11.  It seems clear that, in the decade between Weber and 
Casey, the Supreme Court’s approach to statutory interpretation underwent a significant transfor-
mation; almost assuredly, the Court that decided Casey would have decided Weber differently. 
 63. Casey, 499 U.S. at 112. 
 64. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 563 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing 
I.N.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987); United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, 489 
U.S. 235, 244 (1989)). 
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“scrivener’s error exception” to the canon that, where “the statute’s lan-
guage is plain, the sole function of the court is to enforce it according to 
its terms.”65  Although committed to the result dictated by a statute’s lit-
eral terms, Justice Scalia has expressed a willingness to depart from 
those terms where the literal interpretation produces an absurd or un-
workable result.66 
More importantly, the Supreme Court has not abandoned the view 
that the language of a statute must be read in the relevant context.  The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the “first step in interpreting a 
statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and un-
ambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.”67  
In the Court’s view, the “inquiry must cease if the statutory language is 
unambiguous” (subject to the caveat for absurd results).68  The Court has 
also stated that the “plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is de-
termined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in 
which that language is used and the broader context of the statute as a 
whole.”69  Under this standard, it is not enough for a court to focus sole-
ly on the literal meaning of words the of a statutory provision.  A court 
must examine those words in context, placing them within the specific 
framework of the statute at issue as well as the broader legal framework.  
Standing alone, the literal words may seem clear.  Yet, a contextual 
analysis might reveal an ambiguity.  The analysis may evince that the 
term has a common usage in the law that differs from its dictionary defi-
nition.  Moreover, it may show that the literal reading of the provision 
conflicts with (or undermines) other provisions in the statute.  In either 
case, a court would be justified in declaring the statute ambiguous and 
engaging in a further explication of statutory meaning, based on legisla-
tive history or statutory purpose.  As one commentator has observed, the 
new textualism escapes the “no-context objection;” it “considers as con-
text dictionaries, and grammar books, the whole statute, analogous pro-
visions in other statutes, canons of construction, and the common sense 
God gave us.”70 
                                                          
 65. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 723-24 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 66. Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-28 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring). 
 67. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 341. 
 70. Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 7, at 669.  Although the new textualism escapes the 
“no-context objection,” there may be limitations on a party’s ability to exploit the broader context of 
the statute to create ambiguity.  In practical terms, the case for ambiguity is more easily made when 
there is at least some play in the language itself.  See discussion infra notes 133, 140 and accompa-
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This understanding of new textualism is critical.  There is no doubt 
that new textualism focuses the interpretive inquiry on the statute’s text.  
However, the new textualists recognize the wisdom of Justice Holmes’ 
admonition that a “word is not crystal, transparent and unchanged.”  Ra-
ther, it is the skin of living thought and may vary greatly in color and 
content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is 
used.”71  There is room for maneuvering within the constraints imposed 
by the new textualism paradigm.  The question for the practitioner is 
how to exploit that wiggle room to achieve a result that does not appear 
to be supported by a statute’s literal terms. 
II.  THE INTERPRETIVE APPROACHES 
With this background in mind, we now turn to the interpretative ap-
proaches available to the practitioner in cases where the text does not 
clearly resolve the matter in the practitioner’s favor.  Justice Cardozo 
reminds us that “[l]awsuits are rare and catastrophic experiences for the 
vast majority of men, and even when the catastrophe ensues the contro-
versy relates most often not to the law, but to the facts.  In countless liti-
gation, the law is so clear that judges have no discretion.”72  Justice 
Cardozo also urges that, the serious business of the judge “begins in 
those cases where the colors do not match; when the references in the 
index fail.”73  The same could be said for the practitioner, who must also 
do his best work “when the colors do not match.”  Let us assume that a 
statutory provision does not clearly support the practitioner’s position.  
Let us assume, in fact, that the literal terms of the statute seem to point 
in a different direction.  How does the practitioner respond? 
A.  The Plain Language Gambit 
The first approach available to the practitioner is to invoke the plain 
language rule.  At first blush, this might appear foolhardy.  The plain 
language rule operates to a party’s advantage when the language of the 
statute unambiguously supports the party’s position.  In our scenario, the 
literal terms of the statute work against the party’s position.  Under these 
circumstances, why bother with the plain language rule? 
One reason is simple, the plain language rule is a powerful weapon, 
especially in a textualist era.  No one wants to cede away the textual 
                                                          
nying text. 
 71. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918). 
 72. CARDOZO, supra note 22, at 128-29. 
 73. Id. at 21. 
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high ground; no one wants to readily concede that the language of the 
statute does not clearly support his position.  Parties fear that if they do 
not invoke the plain language rule, their opponent surely will—to the 
opponent’s advantage. 
Truth be told, no canon of construction is more tortured than the 
plain language rule.  In most litigated cases, the interpretive issue is a 
close one.  If the language were truly plain,” the parties would not be in 
court squabbling over its meaning.  It is not uncommon for both sides in 
a statutory dispute to claim the plain language mantle.  Obviously, both 
sides cannot be correct.  In many cases, neither side is correct because 
the language is not plain.  The plain language rule is invoked because of 
its rhetorical power; the Orwellian assumption, not entirely misplaced, 
that by saying something is true you make it true. 
An additional reason for invoking the plain language rule in seem-
ingly inapposite circumstances is organizational.  The Supreme Court 
has stated that the interpretive inquiry begins with a statute’s text.  Alt-
hough the Court has indicated that an unambiguous text generally ends 
the interpretive inquiry, a party rarely stops at the text.  Typically, the 
party first advances a textual argument.  Next, the party marshals the rel-
evant legislative history.  Lastly, the party looks to the broader purpose 
of the statute.  This linear form of argument tends to provoke plain lan-
guage arguments.  A party wants to construct an argument in which the 
text, history and purpose combine to create a clear picture of congres-
sional intent.  To strike the right note, at the textual stage, a party will 
want to argue that the text is plain.  The party will structure the argument 
in this manner: the language of the statute is clear; any doubt on the 
point is put to rest by the legislative history; the reading of the statute 
supported by the text and history furthers the overall purpose of the stat-
ute. 
An example of the use of the plain language rule, in seemingly hos-
tile textual waters, can be found in a recent Supreme Court case, Circuit 
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.74  Adams involved the proper interpretation 
of Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act  (FAA).75  That Section ex-
cludes from the reach of the FAA “contracts of employment of seamen, 
railroad employees, or any other class of worker engaged in foreign or 
interstate commerce.”76  On its face, this provision appears to betray an 
ambiguity.  Does the provision extend just to workers, such as seamen or 
                                                          
 74. 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
 75. Federal Arbitration Act § 1, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2001). 
 76. Federal Arbitration Act § 1. 
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railroad employees, directly involved in the transportation of people or 
services in interstate commerce, or does the provision extend to some 
broader class of workers, e.g., those “engaged in” interstate commerce?  
Section 2 of FAA, the FAA’s coverage provision, further complicates 
the picture because it extends the statute to a “written provision in any 
maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce.”77  The phrase “involving commerce,” as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court,78 is broader than the phrase “engaged in” commerce,” as 
used in Section 1 of the FAA.  This suggests that the Section 1 exclusion 
does not reach all employment contracts otherwise covered under the 
Act.  If anything, the language tends to support a narrower construction 
of the Section 1 exclusion.  Certainly, the statute would have to be clas-
sified as ambiguous. 
Despite these textual points, the United States filed a brief as ami-
cus curiae, invoking the plain language rule to argue that Section 1 of 
the FAA broadly excluded all employment contracts otherwise subject to 
the Act.  The United States urged that the ordinary meaning of the Sec-
tion 1 phrase excludes from the FAA all employment contracts that 
could come within the FAA under Section 2.79  The United States 
stressed that, when the FAA was passed, the phrases “involving com-
merce” and “engaged in commerce” had identical dictionary definitions 
and, thus, were interchangeable terms.80  As the United States stated: 
Absent indications to the contrary, Congress is ordinarily presumed to 
have used the ordinary and common meanings of the terms it employs 
in statutes.  These ordinary meanings, however, are necessarily the 
meanings of the terms at the time Congress enacted the statute.’  Dic-
tionaries from the period when Congress enacted the FAA establish 
that the terms ‘involved in’ and ‘engaged in’ had the same meaning.81 
Was this a credible use of the plain language rule?  The point is de-
batable.  As it turns out, there are strong arguments, rooted in history, 
context and logic, that Congress intended to exclude all employment 
contracts from the reach of the FAA.  Would it not have been more per-
suasive for the United States to adopt the approach, discussed below,82 
of pointing out the ambiguities in the text and then turning to arguments 
                                                          
 77. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2001). 
 78. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273 (1995). 
 79. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 6, Circuit City 
Stores, Inc. v. Adams 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (No. 99-1379). 
 80. Id. at 7. 
 81. Id. (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). 
 82. See infra part II.C. 
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of history, context, and logic to make the case for a broader reading of 
the Section 1 exclusion?  Perhaps, but, to do so, would have arguably 
ceded too much ground on the textual point.  The United States chose 
the more positive approach of wedding its arguments based on history, 
context, and logic to a plain language argument.  In these circumstances, 
that approach can be defended.83 
So what are the downsides to invoking the plain language rule in 
the face of a statute that does not, by its terms, seem overly supportive of 
a party’s position.  The most obvious is a loss of credibility.  Judges 
know that adversaries inflate the facts and the law.  To some degree, this 
is expected and tolerated.  However, a party cannot push this judicial 
grace too far.  To invoke the plain language rule, when the language of 
the statute is stacked against your side, risks a loss of credibility.  To in-
voke the plain language rule when the statute is woefully ambiguous 
presents a similar risk.  When a litigant loses credibility in a court’s 
eyes, it loses its most valuable asset. 
A second problem with the plain language argument is a loss of 
flexibility.  When a party acknowledges that the statute is ambiguous, 
the party can concede textual points without losing the war.  The party 
can point to those features of the statute that favor its position and those 
features that do not.  However, when the party rests an argument on the 
plain language rule, there is little margin for error.  Any perceived ambi-
guity may cause the plain language argument to unravel.  The party must 
constantly put out the “textual fire” by rigidly arguing in the face of con-
trary evidence, that a seemingly ambiguous statute is in fact unambigu-
ous. 
The final problem with the use of the plain language rule in these 
situations is that it has the practical effect of forcing the party to either 
win or lose the case on the plain language point.  A statute may be am-
biguous.  A party may have strong arguments, based on history and pur-
pose, that the ambiguity should be resolved in its favor.  However, statu-
tory arguments almost always begin with the text.  When a party invokes 
the plain language rule, it short-circuits its secondary, non-textual argu-
ments.  This is because the court itself will view the argument largely in 
terms of the way in which it is framed by the party—either the language 
is plain, in which case the party wins, or the language is not plain, in 
                                                          
 83. Although the approach can be defended, as it turns out, it proved unsuccessful.  The Su-
preme Court, in a 5-4 decision, adopted the narrow construction of the Section 1 exclusion, holding 
that the exclusion “exempts from the FAA only contracts of employment of transportation work-
ers.”  Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 121 S. Ct. 1302, 1311 (2000).  532 U.S. 105, (2001).  The 
Court did not address the specific textual argument advanced by the United States.  Id. 
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which case the party loses (irrespective of the other indicia of congres-
sional intent).  Conceivably, a court could reconstruct the argument for 
the party by holding that while the language is not plain, it is ambiguous 
and the ambiguity can be resolved in the party’s favor.  But courts are 
reactive, not proactive decision-makers.  If a party uses the plain lan-
guage rule as the underpinning of its statutory argument, a court is likely 
to take the party at its word.  If the party loses on that point, the court 
may well decide the case against the party without further inquiry.84 
What then is the proper approach to the issue?  Does one employ 
the plain language gambit?  Or does one admit the ambiguity in a statute 
and argue from there?  Here, as in so many other areas of the law, it 
comes down to a question of judgment.  If the textual argument is a 
close one, as it arguably was in the Adams case, the use of the plain lan-
guage rule may be the most effectively persuasive device.  However, 
where a plain language argument cannot be credibly made, a party is 
well-advised to stay away from plain language rhetoric.  At best, use of 
the plain language rule will be a distraction.  At worst, it will defeat an 
otherwise viable statutory argument.  As we shall see, there are better 
ways to exploit textualist thinking than to torture the plain language rule. 
On a final note, the Supreme Court has indicated that the plainness 
of a statute is to be determined “by reference to the language itself, the 
specific context in which that language is used and the broader context 
of the statute as a whole.”85  This means two things.  First, a statutory 
provision that is seemingly plain, viewed in isolation, can be rendered 
ambiguous by an examination of the specific and general context.  This 
point is discussed further below.86 
How far can one push this point?  Take, for example, a statute 
whose literal terms, viewed in isolation, appear to support a plain lan-
guage reading at odds with a party’s position.  Can the party use the 
“specific context” in which those words are used and “the broader con-
text of the statute as a whole” to flip the result to a plain language read-
ing in its favor?  Not likely.  Arguing from the inside out (from the lit-
eral terms of the statute, read in isolation, to the terms viewed in context) 
is an effective way to create textual ambiguity.  It is also an effective 
way, in some cases, to resolve textual ambiguity.  It is not a way, how-
                                                          
 84. This would not be a critical point if a party could simply argue in the alternative, i.e., “I 
win because the language is plain or, if not, I win because the language is ambiguous and the other 
indicia of congressional intent favor me.”  However, there are practical difficulties in making alter-
native arguments of this nature.  See infra part II.D. 
 85. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997). 
 86. See infra part II.C., part III. 
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ever, to reverse entirely, the judgment of the literal language, standing 
alone.  The Supreme Court has left room for context, even at the thresh-
old stage of determining “the plainness or ambiguity of statutory lan-
guage.”87  It has not, however, left that much room.  In this sense as 
well, the plain language approach has its limits. 
Second, a statutory provision that is seemingly ambiguous, viewed 
in isolation, can be made plain by an examination of the specific and 
general context.  This, in effect, is what occurred in the Casey case,88 
where the Court eliminated the potential ambiguity in the statute (wheth-
er the terms “attorney’s fees” and “costs” were sufficiently broad to en-
compass expert witness fees) by comparing that statute to analogous 
statutes. 
B.  The Textual End Run 
The second option for the practitioner is to do a textual end run.  As 
noted above, even the new textualists concede that there may be cases in 
which a court is authorized to digress from the statute’s plain terms.  
These cases are rare, in their view, but they do exist where the effect of 
implementing the ordinary meaning of the statutory text would be patent 
absurdity or “demonstrably at odds with intentions of its drafters.”89  A 
party, confronted with hostile text, can opt to invoke this line of argu-
ment. 
For obvious reasons, this is a high-risk strategy.  Historically, 
courts were willing to trump text to further the statutory purpose.  For 
example, in the Scrivener case, the Supreme Court relied principally on 
the manifest purpose of the NLRA’s anti-retaliation provision.90  The 
text was mentioned, but only peripherally.91  Similarly, in Weber, the 
Supreme Court was able to escape the plain language of the statute by 
invoking the “familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the 
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor 
within the intention of its makers.”92  These decisions, right or wrong, 
                                                          
 87. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text. 
 88. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991). 
 89. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 563 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing I.N.S. v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987); United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, 489 U.S. 235, 
244 (1989)). 
 90. The Court began its interpretive analysis with a discussion of statutory purpose.  See 
NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 121 (1972). 
 91. Id. at 122. 
 92. United States Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979) (citing Holy Trini-
ty Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)). 
20
Akron Law Review, Vol. 35 [2002], Iss. 3, Art. 3
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol35/iss3/3
GREGORY1.DOC 1/22/2021  3:36 PM 
2002] OVERCOMING TEXT IN AN AGE OF TEXTUALISM 471 
are relics of a by-gone era.93  In the current interpretive milieu, any re-
sort to statutory purpose as a source of legislative meaning independent 
of text is likely to be met with a chilly reception. 
At the very least, the practitioner should be aware of the difficulties 
in pressing this type of argument.  The new textualists are well-versed in 
public choice theory.  This theory states that because legislation is the 
product of compromises among groups, “attributing a purpose to a stat-
ute may either: (1) improperly privilege the interests of one group over 
another (thereby undermining the bargain); (2) or may impute a purpose 
where none (other than the desire to reach agreement) existed.”94  Ad-
herents of public choice theory are highly skeptical of proposed interpre-
tations that argue from some fixed statutory purpose.  This is because 
they are convinced that no such fixed purpose can be properly identified.  
No statute has a single statutory purpose.  Every statute is the product of 
a give-and-take.  To the public choice theorist, attempts to discern legis-
lative intent from a statute’s purpose” are foolhardy.95 
A case that illustrates the public choice theory is Rodriguez v. Unit-
ed States.96  In that case, a Circuit Court read the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act of 1984 as superseding a prior federal statute that gave fed-
eral judges the authority to suspend the execution of certain sentences 
and impose probation.  The court did so despite the fact that the 1984 
Act contained no explicit repeal of the prior statute.  The court rested its 
conclusion, in part, “on its understanding of the broad purposes of the 
1984 Act, which included decreasing the frequency with which persons 
on pretrial release commit crimes and diminishing the sentencing discre-
tion of judges.”97  The Supreme Court took issue with that approach.  
The Court stated that “no legislation pursues its purposes at all costs.”98  
Deciding “what competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the 
achievement of a particular objective is the very essence of legislative 
choice and it frustrates, rather than effectuates the legislative intent by 
assuming that whatever furthers the statute’s primary objective must be 
the law.”99  The Court concluded that “where the language of a provision 
is sufficiently clear in its context, there is no occasion to examine the 
additional considerations of policy . . . that may have influenced the 
                                                          
 93. The result in at least one of these cases, Scrivener, can be justified under a textual analy-
sis.  See infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text. 
 94. Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 28. 
 95. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 548 (1983). 
 96. 480 U.S. 522 (1987). 
 97. Id. at 525. 
 98. Id. at 525-26. 
 99. Id. at 526. 
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lawmakers in their formulation of the statute.”100 
Rulings such as this reveal the difficulties that a party confronts 
when attempting to end run text on the basis of an ill-defined statutory 
purpose.  It is not enough to invoke a statute’s “remedial purpose.”  Nor 
is it enough to show that the non-literal reading of the statute makes 
more “sense”.  The Supreme Court lectern is littered with the remains of 
advocates who have constructed seemingly air-tight arguments as to why 
Congress could not possibly have intended a particular result only to 
have those arguments thrashed by skeptical Justices, who question the 
ability of any onlooker to know what Congress really intended.  To have 
any prospect for success under this approach, the party must point to 
something very concrete.  The best case for a textual override is that the 
statute is unworkable or dysfunctional if read in accordance with its lit-
eral terms, or that it is irrational to the point of absurdity and Congress 
did not intend for absurd results.  To trump text, the degree of irrationali-
ty must be severe. 
If a party opts for this interpretive approach, it must be up-front.  
The party must not invoke the old case law, recite the purpose-oriented 
chestnuts from that case law (e.g., the “spirit” of the statute prevails over 
its plain terms) and argue the case as if the purpose-oriented approach 
were still in vogue.  It must acknowledge, up–front, the extraordinary 
nature of the argument, justify the reason for departing from the plain 
text and make the best case possible. 
If that sounds like an uphill battle, well, it is.  As a stand-alone ap-
proach, the textual end run is a long shot.  The approach might fare bet-
ter, however, when paired with another interpretive approach.  I return to 
this point later.101 
C.  Using Text to Bypass Text 
We now turn to the third option left for the practitioner.  By design, 
the Article framed these approaches in “Goldilocks” fashion.  The plain 
language gambit is “too hot.”  The textual end run is “too cold.”  Now 
comes the approach that is just right.”  This Article promotes the view 
that this approach using text to bypass text holds out the best chance of 
overcoming seemingly hostile text. 
This interpretive approach is simple enough to describe.  The Su-
preme Court has made clear that the plain language of a statute typically 
controls.  The Court has also indicated, however, that, in determining the 
                                                          
 100. Id. (citing Aaron v. S.E.C., 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980)). 
 101. See infra part II.D. 
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plainness of a statute, a court must look, not only at the language of the 
particular statutory provision in isolation, but at the “specific context in 
which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a 
whole.”  A provision may, at first blush, appear clear.  When examined, 
however, in context, that clarity may disappear, causing the court to con-
clude that the statute is ambiguous.  When a statute is ambiguous, the 
court itself must resolve that ambiguity, and it may do so by reference to 
the broader indicia of intent, such as statutory purpose.  If a party can 
persuade a court that the statute is ambiguous, and if the broader indicia 
of intent favor that party’s position, the party can prevail. 
The advantages of this approach are obvious.  First, it deploys tex-
tualist ideology and rhetoric.  The new textualism emphasizes the prima-
cy of text; it instructs the interpreter to resolve the statutory dispute, if at 
all possible, by reference to the text read in context.  The textual bypass 
approach does just that.  It does not avoid the text; it welcomes the text 
with open arms.  The text is run through the ringer, examined, probed 
and poked.  Only when the end result of this textual exegesis is an unre-
solved ambiguity does the approach open the door to other indicia of in-
tent, such as legislative history or a broader statutory purpose.  This is 
precisely the result advocated by the new textualism. 
A second advantage of this approach is that it gives a party credibil-
ity and flexibility.  Because this approach acknowledges the possibility 
of ambiguity, a party is not required to use the plain language feint—to 
pretend as if an ambiguous statute is in fact clear.  A party, moreover, 
need not maintain an air-tight ship.  The party may concede that the stat-
ute is less than pellucid.  The party can even concede that certain fea-
tures of the text favor the other side’s position.  Indeed, the argument 
can be structured as a tit-for-tat, i.e., here are the features of the statute 
favoring my position, here are the features favoring the other side’s posi-
tion.  So long as the argument leaves some room for doubt, the party has 
done all it needs to do to open the statute to a broader interpretive in-
quiry. 
Differences between this interpretive approach and the plain lan-
guage gambit are evident.  The plain language approach requires a party 
to argue the case as if the statute were crystal clear.  In cases where the 
text appears to favor the other side, such an argument may not be credi-
ble.  The plain language approach also requires a party to hold the text in 
a vise grip.  A party cannot concede a single textual point or else the 
plain language argument begins to unravel.  In using text to point out 
statutory ambiguity, a party avoids being forced into what may be an un-
reasonable statutory argument. 
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Despite the obvious advantages of this interpretive approach, there 
are some potential downsides.   First, in interpretive battles, one is al-
ways reluctant to concede away a textual point.  Most lawyers prefer to 
take the offensive.  Most courts expect nothing less than the most ag-
gressive, some might say shrill, lawyering.  By conceding ambiguity, a 
party assumes a defensive posture.  A party effectively concedes that the 
statute does not clearly support its interpretation.  This could be per-
ceived by the court as a sign of weakness; an admission that the text 
does not support that party’s position.  This stands in contrast to the 
plain language approach which presents the statutory argument in the 
most positive light. 
A second downside is that a party must cross two rivers to reach the 
other side.  A party must first convince a court that the statute is ambig-
uous.  This, itself, may be no easy task, but it is only half the battle.  To 
prevail, the party must also persuade the court that the unresolved ambi-
guity in the statute should be resolved in that party’s favor.  This pro-
vides a contrast with the plain language approach.  Under that approach, 
there is rarely a second act.  If a party persuades the court that the lan-
guage clearly supports that party’s position, the matter ends (except in 
those rare cases in which the court is willing to set aside the plain mean-
ing of the statute). 
These factors suggest that the textual bypass approach is not for 
every case.  If the textual arguments are close and the broader indicia of 
intent do not clearly favor a party’s position, the party may be better off 
taking its chances with the plain language approach.  However, the anal-
ysis changes if the party is likely to lose the textual battle (if argued as a 
dueling plain language case), and there are compelling arguments of his-
tory, purpose and logic that favor the party’s position.  In that circum-
stance, the optimal interpretive strategy is one that argues for textual 
ambiguity, thereby providing a text-centered argument for bypassing the 
unfavorable text and reaching the more favorable, secondary sources of 
legislative meaning. 
D.  The Combination Approach 
The above discussion assumes that these interpretive approaches 
are mutually exclusive.  This, of course, is not necessarily true.  Litigants 
can make multiple arguments in the alternative.  At least in theory, it is 
possible for a party to combine interpretive approaches in a single case. 
The most obvious pairing of interpretative approaches brings to-
gether the two non-plain language approaches, the textual end run and 
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the textual bypass.  In a case in which the plain language approach is not 
available to a party, a party has two choices: (1) argue that this is the 
type of case in which the court can set aside the statute’s plain meaning; 
or (2) argue that the statute is ambiguous.  A party does not have to 
choose only one approach.  It may argue that the text is ambiguous and 
that the ambiguity should be resolved in the party’s favor, and, in the al-
ternative, argue that the broader indicia of intent are so compelling that 
they trump the statute’s literal terms, even assuming that those terms are 
not ambiguous. 
In using this combination approach, it is critical that the party begin 
with the approach that is most text-centered.  That is, begin the argument 
by making the case for textual ambiguity and then turn to the textual end 
run as a fallback argument.  Again, in the new textualism era, any argu-
ment that places text first is favored. 
The combination that seems most unlikely is the pairing of the plain 
language gambit and the textual end run.  The plain language approach 
argues with confidence that the terms of the statute plainly support the 
party’s position.  If the language is truly plain (or at least arguably so), it 
is non-sensical to argue that the language plainly supports the other 
side’s position, thus requiring a textual override.  Of course, in advanc-
ing the plain language argument, a party will want to follow the textual 
argument with a discussion of the relevant history, context, and purpose.  
The party should frame that discussion as supportive of the plain mean-
ing argument; it should not pit these broader indicia of intent against 
text. 
The more difficult pairing is that of the plain language gambit and 
the textual bypass.  It might appear that these two approaches are easily 
wed.  A party starts by invoking the plain language rule.  The party ar-
gues that the statute’s plain terms support its position.  The party argues, 
in the alternative, that the statute is ambiguous and that the ambiguity 
should be resolved in the party’s favor. 
In practice, it is much harder to achieve a bond of these two ap-
proaches.  Legal briefs are written with a single voice.  They have a cen-
tral theme, a thesis, that carries through the brief.  In the context of in-
terpretive arguments, the defining moment of the brief is the initial 
textual volley.  If a party sounds the plain language theme, that theme 
typically sets the tone for everything that follows.  Although it is not un-
usual for litigants to advance alternative arguments, the shift in empha-
sis, from “the statute is plain” to the “statute is ambiguous,” is awkward, 
at best, self-defeating, at worst. 
Indeed, there are structural problems with attempting this combina-
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tion approach.  A party begins by arguing plain language.  The party 
then shifts gears completely by arguing that the statute is ambiguous.  To 
make this argument persuasively, the party must unpack or deconstruct 
the statute.  The party might begin by pointing to the ambiguities in the 
statutory provision at issue.  The party may expand the inquiry to draw 
comparisons to other provisions of that statute or other related statutes to 
create ambiguity in the statute.  Finally, the party might point to broader 
contextual factors, such as the law predating the statute’s enactment, in 
an attempt to raise ambiguity.  By the time the party is finished, it may 
have emphasized the ambiguity to such an extent that it harpooned the 
initial plain language argument. 
Take for example a statute that provides rules for the registration of 
“cats, dogs and any other animal.”  If a party wants to argue that these 
rules apply to horses, the party must begin with a plain language argu-
ment.  The party may argue that the phrase “any other animal,” by its 
plain terms, applies to horses.  In the alternative, the party may argue 
that the statute is ambiguous but should be construed as covering horses.  
The party could acknowledge that, under the interpretive canon known 
as ejusdem generis, the phrase “any other animal” is construed in the 
context of the list that precedes it.  This arguably supports a narrower in-
terpretation of the phrase, limiting its reach to other domestic pets such 
as cats or dogs.  Moreover, the statutory section of which this provision 
is a part appears to contemplate regulation of domestic pets; most of the 
provisions focus on domestic pet issues. 
On the other hand, assume that there is a closely related statute 
governing a different issue of animal regulation that uses the phrase 
“cats, dogs and any other domestic pet.”  This suggests that the use of 
the phrase “any other animal,” in the statutory provision at issue, was in-
tended to give the provision a broader reach.  From this, the party may 
urge that the statute is ambiguous and in need of judicial explication 
based on the broader indicia of intent (which, in this case, support the 
party’s position).  The party may have made a convincing case for statu-
tory ambiguity, resolved in the party’s favor by the broader manifesta-
tions of intent.  However, by doing so it has undermined completely the 
initial plain language argument.  The party, in effect, has argued against 
itself. 
Of course, one can always argue that the language of a statute is 
plain and simply acknowledge, in passing, the possibility of an ambigui-
ty.  In other words, the party can make a plain language argument, note 
that the statute is possibly ambiguous, and then proceed to the other in-
dicia of intent —–such as context, purpose and history.  However, this is 
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not a combination of the plain language and textual bypass approaches.  
It is simply a deployment of the plain language approach with a slight 
disclaimer or safety valve added to the argument.  To effectively argue a 
case under the plain language and textual bypass approaches, is a diffi-
cult, if not impossible feat. 
This discussion suggests that, in making an interpretive argument in 
those cases in which the text might appear to be less than supportive, a 
party must carefully choose an interpretive strategy.  A party must 
choose between the plain language gambit and the textual bypass, each 
of which has its advantages and disadvantages.  The choice of interpre-
tive strategy will dictate the way in which the argument is constructed 
and, ultimately, the success or lack of success of that argument. 
III.  A SUPREME COURT PARADIGM: ROBINSON V. SHELL OIL CO. 
With these approaches in mind, we can now turn to a real-world 
example.  The example is instructive for a number of reasons.  First, it 
illustrates the benefits of the textual bypass approach.  Second, it sug-
gests how a party can achieve the same result, in textual terms, that 
would have been achievable in non-textual terms under prior interpretive 
paradigms.  Finally, it raises questions about how far the textual bypass 
approach can be pushed, which in turn transitions nicely into the last 
section of the Article. 
The real-world example is Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.102  Robinson 
involved a claim of unlawful retaliation under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.103  The plaintiff in Robinson had been fired from his 
job with the defendant.  The plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination 
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.  After the charge 
was filed, the defendant provided a negative job reference to a prospec-
tive employer of the plaintiff.  The plaintiff claimed that the defendant 
provided the negative reference to the plaintiff as a retaliation for the 
charges that the plaintiff filed against the employer.  The plaintiff argued 
that the negative reference was an unlawful retaliation under Title VII.  
The defendant argued that the protections of Title VII did not extend to 
the plaintiff’s claim because Title VII only protected employees, not 
former employees, from unlawful retaliation. 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant.104 
                                                          
 102. 519 U.S. 337 (1997). 
 103. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994). 
 104. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc), rev’d, 519 U.S. 337 
(1997). 
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The Court of Appeals relied on the plain language of the statute,105 
which makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any of 
his employees or applicants for employment” because of the protected 
activity (e.g., charge-filing) of those employees or applicants.106  The 
court ruled that, by its plain terms, the statute extends to employees and 
applicants for employment, not former employees.  The court acknowl-
edged that a number of circuit courts had read the statute more broadly 
but asserted that these decisions “depend on broad policy arguments not 
supported by the plain language of Title VII.”107  The court concluded 
that because Congress had chosen, “in no uncertain terms,” not to pro-
tect former employees, the court was not free to interpret the statute in 
accordance with the “underlying policies” of the anti-retaliation provi-
sion.108 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Robinson and unanimously 
reversed the Fourth Circuit decision.  The Supreme Court stated that the 
“first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language 
at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particu-
lar dispute in the case.”109  The Court stressed that “a court’s inquiry 
must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory 
scheme is coherent and consistent.”110  The Court proceeded to clarify 
that “the plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by 
reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that lan-
guage is used and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”111 
With these precepts as its guide, the Court concluded that the lan-
guage of the statute did not unambiguously foreclose coverage of former 
employees.  The Court acknowledged that, “[a]t first blush, the term 
‘employees’ in [the anti-retaliation provision] would seem to refer to 
those having an existing employment relationship with the employer in 
question.”112  The Court determined, however, that “[t]his initial impres-
sion” does not withstand scrutiny in the context of [the anti-retaliation 
provision].”113  The Court stressed that “there is no temporal qualifier in 
                                                          
 105. Id. at 331-32. 
 106. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994). 
 107. Robinson, 70 F.3d at 332.  The Court described these decisions as “at odds with the well-
settled rule that in the absence of expressed Congressional intent, courts must assume that Congress 
intended to convey the language’s ordinary meaning.”  Id. 
 108. Id. at 332. 
 109. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 341. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
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the statute such as would make plain that [the anti-retaliation provision] 
protects only persons still employed at the time of the retaliation.”114  In 
particular, the statute defines the term “employee” to mean an individual 
employed by an employer,” not an individual who “is employed” by an 
employer.115  The Court found additional ambiguity in the simple fact 
that the term “employee” does not have some intrinsically plain mean-
ing” that renders the term unambiguous.116  Finally, the court deemed it 
significant that “a number of other provisions in Title VII use the term 
‘employees’ to mean something more inclusive or different from ‘cur-
rent employees.’”117  The Court concluded that, “[o]nce it is established 
that the term ‘employees’ includes former employees in some sections, 
but not in others, the term standing alone is necessarily ambiguous.”118 
Having concluded that the statute was ambiguous, the Court as-
sumed the role of resolving that ambiguity.119  The Court did so by look-
ing to the “broader context” of the statute, which seemed to “contem-
plate that former employees would make use of the remedial 
mechanisms of Title VII.”120  The Court also drew support from the 
plaintiff’s argument that the word ‘employees’ includes former employ-
ees because to hold otherwise would effectively vitiate much of the pro-
tection afforded by the [anti-retaliation provision].”121  The Court agreed 
with the plaintiff “that it would be destructive of this purpose of the anti-
retaliation provision for an employer to be able to retaliate with impunity 
against an entire class of acts under Title VII.”122 
Robinson provides a virtual road map for using textual argument to 
dodge a seemingly hostile text.  The vehicle for doing so is the textual 
bypass approach.  The Court invoked the rhetoric of the new textualism.  
The Court made clear that statutory text, seemingly plain, could be 
                                                          
 114. Id. 
 115. Robinson, 70 F.3d at 342 (emphasis in original) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994)). 
 116. Id. at 344 n.4. 
 117. For example, Section 717(c) of Title VII provides that an “employee or applicant for em-
ployment, if aggrieved, by the final disposition of his complaint, . . . may file a civil action . . . .”  42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-16(e) (1996).  Given “that discriminatory discharge is a forbidden ‘personnel ac-
tion[n] affecting employees,’ the term ‘employee’ in [Section] 717(c) necessarily includes a former 
employee.”  Robinson, 519 U.S. at 343 (citation omitted). 
 118. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 343. 
 119. Id. at 345. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 346.  As the Court explained, exclusion of former employees “would undermine the 
effectiveness of Title VII by allowing the threat of post-employment retaliation to deter victims of 
discrimination from complaining to the EEOC, and would provide a perverse incentive for employ-
ees to fire employees who might bring Title VII claims.”  Id. 
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viewed as ambiguous when read in context.  The Court construed the an-
ti-retaliation provision by referencing other provisions in Title VII; pro-
visions that seemed to belie the argument that the protections of the stat-
ute did not extend to former employees.  Having reached the conclusion 
that the statute was ambiguous, the Court went on to assign meaning to 
the statute, based on broader arguments of context, purpose and logic. 
What makes Robinson significant is that the Court reached its con-
clusion in terms that are acceptable to the new textualists.  Historically, a 
number of circuit courts had concluded that Title VII’s anti-retaliation 
provision applied to former employees.  These courts had done so large-
ly on non-textual grounds, invoking the purpose-oriented approach to 
statutory interpretation.  In one case the court acknowledged that the 
words of the statute, “[r]ead literally,” might exclude former employees 
from the reach of the anti-retaliation provision.123  However, the court 
ruled that such a narrow construction would not give effect to the stat-
ute’s purpose, stressing that there is no better guide to the ‘“interpreta-
tion of a statute than its purpose when that is sufficiently disclosed.’”124  
In another case, the court determined that “a strict and narrow interpreta-
tion of the word employee’ to exclude former employees would undercut 
the obvious remedial purposes of Title VII.”125  The court opined that 
the “plain meaning rule should not be applied to produce a result which 
is actually inconsistent with the policies underlying the statute.”126 
It is questionable whether the rationale of these decisions survives 
the shift in interpretive paradigms that has taken place over the past few 
decades.  Certainly, the proponents of the new textualism would be 
skeptical of any approach that denied the primacy of the written word.  
Yet, in Robinson, the Supreme Court unanimously reached the same re-
sult that had been reached in these prior circuit court decisions.  The key 
is that the Court did so by focusing principally on text.  The Court in-
voked the purpose of the anti-retaliation provision but only after it care-
fully sifted through the text and concluded that the statute was ambigu-
ous.  Robinson proves the central point of this Article—that, in an age of 
textualism, the way to overcome seemingly hostile text is not to fight the 
text (or to ignore it) but to use textualist rhetoric to create ambiguity and 
thereby broaden the interpretive inquiry. 
It is instructive in this regard to consider how cases decided under 
the now discarded purpose-oriented regime might fare under the textual 
                                                          
 123. Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052, 1054-55 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 124. Id. at 1055 (quoting Fed. Ins. Deposit Corp. v. Tremaine, 133 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1943)). 
 125. Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 126. Id. 
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bypass approach as articulated in Robinson.  For example, in Scrive-
ner,127 the Supreme Court held that the NLRA’s anti-retaliation provi-
sion extended to individuals who gave “sworn statements” to the Board.  
The Court’s analysis, rooted principally in the “objective” of the statute, 
might be passe.  Yet, the Robinson approach might well have produced 
the same result.  The statute in Scrivener protected individuals who had 
given “testimony.”  The term “testimony” is not unambiguously restrict-
ed to oral testimony in a formal hearing.128  More fundamentally, the 
statute contemplated the participation of individuals in board proceed-
ings under circumstances that would not produce formal testimony.”129  
This suggests that the language of the statute was ambiguous when 
viewed in “the specific context in which that language [was used], and 
the broader context of the statute as a whole.”130  Had the Supreme Court 
documented this ambiguity, it could have then turned to the broader in-
dicia of intent to resolve that ambiguity, rather than relying upon those 
indicia in the first instance; the very anti-textual approach that raises the 
ire of the new textualists.  One could easily rewrite the opinion in 
Scrivener to reach the same result in terms that would meet the demands 
of the new textualism. 
Although Robinson provides a blue print for arguing cases of statu-
tory interpretation in a textualist era, it leaves some questions unan-
swered.  In Robinson, the Court first examined the specific language of 
the statutory provision at issue.  The Court found this language to be 
ambiguous.  The Court then looked outward, examining other sections of 
the statute for signs that Congress had some fixed understanding of stat-
utory coverage.  This statutory outreach confirmed the ambiguity that 
was in the specific language itself.  Robinson suggests that the “plain-
ness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the 
language itself, the specific context in which that language is used and 
the broader context of the statute as a whole.”131  However, there was no 
need to look beyond the language itself” because the language was am-
biguous, a point that the broader context” merely confirmed. 
In other cases, the words of the statutory provision, in isolation, 
might not be ambiguous.  Yet, when examined against the broader con-
                                                          
 127. See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text. 
 128. WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1218 (1998) Testimony is defined as 
“a firsthand authentication of a fact.”  Id. 
 129. NRLB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 124 (1972).  The Scrivener Court raised this feature of 
the statute, but only as a secondary point; it began its analysis with the “objective” of the statute.  Id. 
at 121.  The new textualist would insist that the interpretive analysis begin with the text. 
 130. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997). 
 131. Id. 
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text of the statute as a whole,” an ambiguity might emerge.  This pre-
sents a different scenario than the one in Robinson where there was am-
biguity at every step of the analysis, working from the inside out.  Rob-
inson seemingly supports the view that an ambiguity at any step of the 
analysis is enough to take the case out of the plain language rule.  It must 
be acknowledged, however, that the textual bypass becomes more diffi-
cult when the “language itself” and “the specific context in which that 
language is used” do not point to any ambiguity; thus, leaving only the 
more amorphous argument that the statutory language is ambiguous 
when determined by reference to the “broader context of the statute as a 
whole.”  A party may have a strong argument of statutory ambiguity 
based upon the broader context of the statute.  If at all possible the party 
should first try to suggest some ambiguity in the language of the statuto-
ry provision itself.  Even assuming that the “broader context” of the stat-
ute might support the existence of a statutory ambiguity, it is a risky 
strategy when employing the textual bypass approach to concede a lack 
of ambiguity in the “language itself.” 
IV.  THE INTERPRETIVE APPROACHES IN PRACTICE: A CASE IN POINT 
It is now time to put into practice the principles discussed in this 
Article.  To do so, I turn to an issue of statutory interpretation that is cur-
rently wending its way through the federal courts of appeals.  The issue 
concerns the scope of the anti-retaliation provisions of the federal anti-
discrimination statutes.  The issue is not the same issue of statutory in-
terpretation that occupied the Supreme Court’s attention in Robinson.  
Nevertheless, the Robinson decision may well have some bearing on 
how this issue is resolved. 
In particular, let us focus on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.  That statute makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against 
employees or applicants who have engaged in protected activity under 
Title VII.  Specifically, the statute provides as follows: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to dis-
criminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, 
for an employment agency, or joint labor-management committee con-
trolling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-
job training programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a 
labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or ap-
plicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an 
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has 
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made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.132 
In Robinson, the Supreme Court addressed one of the interpretive 
issues raised by this provision (i.e., the protection of former employees).  
There are, however, other interpretive issues.  One such issue is whether 
the protection of this provision extend to cases of third-party retaliation 
where the employer retaliates against one employee because of the pro-
tected activity of another. 
In the prototypical retaliation case, an employee engages in some 
protected act, such as filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission.  The employer responds by tak-
ing some adverse action against that employee.  However, In some cases 
the employer does not take action against the employee who has en-
gaged in the protected activity, but instead, targets an employee who is 
associated in some way with the employee who has engaged in the pro-
tected activity.  The targeted employee may be a close relative of the 
employee who engaged in the protected activity or the individual on 
whose behalf the other employee engaged in protected activity.  (The 
other employee, for example, may have opposed a discriminatory act di-
rected at the targeted employee.  The employer then retaliates against the 
targeted employee rather than the employee who opposed the discrimi-
natory act.)  In either case, the employer has taken adverse action in re-
taliation for protected activity; however, the employer has not taken ac-
tion against the individual who actually engaged in the protected 
activity. 
A cursory look at the text of the statute reveals the problem.  The 
statute makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any of 
his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he [employee 
or applicant] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 
practice . . . or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or par-
ticipated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing.”133  
The use of the term “he” implies that the statute prohibits an employer 
from discriminating against an employee when that employee engages in 
protected activity.  Read literally, the statute could be construed as not 
applying in cases in which the employer retaliates against one employee 
because of the protected activity of another employee (or individual). 
Courts have split over the question.  The Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has held that the anti-retaliation provision extends to cases of third-
                                                          
 132. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994). 
 133. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
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party retaliation, “i.e., discrimination against one person because of a 
friend’s or relative’s protected activities.”134  The Sixth Circuit has 
stressed that “courts have frequently applied the retaliation provisions of 
employment statutes to matters not expressly covered by the literal terms 
of these statutes where the policy behind the statute supports a non-
exclusive reading of the statutory language.”135  The Fifth Circuit, by 
contrast, has rejected the third-party retaliation theory.136  Invoking the 
“plain language” rule, that court has limited the reach of the anti-
retaliation provision to cases in which the target of the retaliation has 
himself engaged in protected activity.137 
For reasons that should be obvious, this interpretive dispute pro-
vides an excellent illustration for the interpretive approaches discussed 
in this Article.  There is a compelling argument that the purpose of the 
anti-retaliation provision would be compromised if an employer were 
free to retaliate with impunity against the spouse or friend of an employ-
ee who has engaged in protected activity.  Yet, the literal terms of the 
statute might support just such a narrow reading of the provision.  His-
torically, the manifest purpose of the anti-retaliation provision might 
have carried the day in any interpretive dispute.  Under the new textual-
ism paradigm, such a purpose-oriented approach might well fail.  This 
presents a challenge for the party seeking a broader reading of the anti-
retaliation provision.  How best to make the case for a reading of the 
statute that would cover the claim of an employee who suffers an ad-
verse employment action because of the protected activity of another 
employee? 
Clearly, this is not a case in which the plain language gambit is a 
viable option.  There may be some wiggle room in the text that is suffi-
                                                          
 134. EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541, 543 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting DeMedina v. Rein-
hardt, 444 F. Supp. 573 (D.C. 1978), aff’d in part and remanded in part, 686 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 
1982)). 
 135. Id. at 545. 
 136. Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224 (5th Cir. 1996).  Holt involved a claim under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2001).  That statute, howev-
er, contains an anti-retaliation provision that is virtually identical to the provision in Title VII.  
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2001) with 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2001). 
 137. Holt, 89 F. 3d at 1226-27.  Another circuit court has agreed with Holt, although without 
much analysis of the issue.  See Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813 (8th Cir. 1998).  The 
issue has also been addressed in a number of district court decisions, with varying results.  See, e.g., 
Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 788 (M.D. Penn. 2000) (no coverage); Thomas v. 
Am. Horse Shows Ass’n, Inc., No. 97-CV-3513 JG, 1999 WL 287721 (E.D.N.Y. April 23, 1999), 
aff’d 205 F.3d 1324 (2000) (coverage); EEOC v. Nalbandian Sales, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (E.D. 
Cal. 1998) (coverage); Murphy v. Cadillac Rubber & Plastics, 946 F. Supp. 1108 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(coverage). 
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cient to create a statutory ambiguity.  However, the language of the stat-
ute cannot be read as plainly supporting the position that the statute pro-
hibits third-party retaliations.  As discussed above, in many interpretive 
disputes, the critical, tactical decision is whether to argue the case in 
plain language terms or concede ambiguity.  In this case, the statute 
makes the decision for the party.  The plain language argument is simply 
not available. 
On the other hand, this case seems well suited for the textual end 
run.  There is a very strong argument that the purpose of the anti-
retaliation provision would be thwarted if employers were free to engage 
in third-party retaliations.  An employer could target non-participating 
employees for retaliation and engage in a campaign of purging protected 
activity from the workplace; the very thing that the anti-retaliation provi-
sion seeks to guard against.  The problem is that, in an era governed by 
the new textualism, the textual end run is at best a long shot.  The textual 
end run might work as an alternative argument in combination with the 
textual bypass approach.  However, to base the statutory argument on 
nothing more than a non-textual, purpose-oriented analysis is a risky 
proposition that is likely to incur the wrath of a textualist judge who will 
want to see, at least, some textual analysis. 
This leaves the textual bypass approach.  In some ways, the third-
party retaliation issue closely resembles the issue before the Supreme 
Court in Robinson.  As in Robinson, the dispute focuses on the anti-
retaliation provision of Title VII.  As in Robinson, the party seeking 
coverage is confronted by a text that is not plainly supportive of cover-
age.  As in Robinson, there is a compelling argument that the purpose of 
the anti-retaliation provision would be thwarted if the provision were 
given a narrow reading.  Despite these similarities, there is one critical 
difference.  In Robinson, the dispute turned on whether the term “em-
ployees” necessarily meant “current employees.”  The Court was able to 
say that the statute was ambiguous because the term “employee” does 
not necessarily mean “current employee” and the statutory definition of 
“employee”—an “individual employed by an employer”—contains no 
temporal qualifier.  In the case of third-party retaliations, the dispute 
turns on the fact that the statute refers to retaliation against an employee 
because “he”—the employee—has engaged in protected activity.  The 
ambiguity that was relatively easy to identify in Robinson does not exist 
on this issue.  Thus, if a party is to argue ambiguity based on the “lan-
guage itself,” it must do so on some other ground.  As discussed above, 
it is possible to bypass the language of the statute in isolation and argue 
ambiguity on the basis of the “broader context of the statute as a 
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whole.”138  This approach, however, may concede too much.  In theory, 
a textualist judge might be willing to accept an argument based on a con-
textual analysis.  In practice, however, failing to identify some ambigui-
ty in the literal words themselves could be fatal.  Textualists are not fond 
of any argument that requires a judge to supplement or modify the lan-
guage of a statute.  It is one thing to extend the coverage of a statute by 
construing ambiguous language.  It is another thing to extend coverage 
by construing language that, on its face, seems clearly to foreclose cov-
erage.  The textualist judge must be given a certain comfort level.  To do 
so, it helps immensely that, context aside, the “language itself” is am-
biguous. 
Is there an argument that the language of the anti-retaliation provi-
sion, by itself, is ambiguous with respect to third-party retaliations?  
Perhaps.  The statute refers to retaliation against an employee because 
“he” has engaged in protected activity.  This suggests that the protection 
of the provision extends only to individuals who have engaged in pro-
tected activity themselves.  Yet, to reach that conclusion, one must infer 
that Congress used these terms in an exclusive sense.  That is a fair in-
ference but not an immutable one. 
It is generally understood, under the maxim of “expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius,” that where “the persons and things to which [a statute] 
refers are designated, there is an inference that all omissions should be 
understood as exclusions.”139  That maxim, however, simply supports an 
“inference” of exclusivity.  Courts have emphasized that, because “not 
every silence is pregnant,” expressio unius is “an uncertain guide to in-
terpreting statutes.”140  Courts have cautioned that the expressio unius 
maxim is “often a valuable servant, but a dangerous master to follow in 
the construction of statutes or documents.”141  That the anti-retaliation 
provision does not specifically refer to third-party retaliations does not, 
by necessity, rule out the possibility that Congress intended to cover 
such retaliations. 
Further, the exclusive reading of the statute rests entirely on the 
term “he.”  “He” may not be ambiguous in the same way that “employ-
ee” was ambiguous in Robinson.  Yet, the term may be broad enough to 
encompass at least some cases of third-party retaliation.  For example, if 
an employer retaliates against a husband because his wife has filed a 
                                                          
 138. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 397, 341 (1997). 
 139. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND’S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.23, at 304-05 
(6th ed. 2001). 
 140. Ill. Dep’t of Public Aid v. Schweiker, 707 F.2d 273, 277 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 141. Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 612 (1927). 
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charge of discrimination, one could plausibly say, due to the closeness of 
the relationship, that retaliation against one is retaliation against the oth-
er.  The “he,” in that context, is interchangeable.  In a similar vein, 
where an employer retaliates against Employee A because Employee B 
has acted on Employee A’s behalf in opposing discrimination in the 
workplace, Employee A has not, himself, engaged in protected activity.  
Yet, another employee, acting as Employee A’s representative has.  
Could it not be said that Employee A is the “he” referenced in the stat-
ute, in the sense that someone engaged in protected activity on his be-
half? 
Certainly, these are not the strongest textual arguments.  And if 
there were nothing more to it, these arguments might well fail.  The 
point here, however, is not to win the case on these arguments alone, but 
to pave the way for the context-based arguments to follow.  To use a 
boxing metaphor, these points serve to soften the opponent, in this case, 
the hard-line textualist judge.  Having accomplished that, the question is 
whether the party can deliver the knockout punch on the basis of a textu-
al argument rooted in the broader context of the statute. 
As it turns out, the broader context of the statute strongly points 
against the restrictive reading of the anti-retaliation provision.  The re-
strictive reading of the anti-retaliation provision reflects an “every man 
for himself” perspective, where the scope of statutory protection for un-
lawful retaliation is coterminous with an individual’s own protected ac-
tivity.  However, Title VII rejects such a “first person” view of the en-
forcement process.  Title VII expressly authorizes the filing of charges 
on behalf of third parties.142  Moreover, under Title VII an individual 
who has not timely filed a charge can rely on the timely charge of anoth-
er employee in pursuing a claim that arises out of “’similar discriminato-
ry treatment in the same time frame.’”143  Reflecting a holistic approach 
to enforcement of the statute, Title VII encourages individuals to file 
charges on behalf of their fellow workers and extends the protection of 
the statute to individuals who have not participated in the enforcement 
process themselves.144 
These features of Title VII are critical.  The anti-retaliation provi-
sion does not stand alone.  It is part of a statutory framework that seeks 
                                                          
 142. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2001). 
 143. Tolliver v. Xerox Corp., 918 F.2d 1052, 1056-57 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Snell v. Suffolk 
County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1100 (2d Cir. 1986)). 
 144. See generally EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 1089 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that 
the “purpose of the charge . . . is not to seek [individual] recovery from the employer but rather to 
inform the EEOC of possible discrimination”). 
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to root out discrimination through a process of informal complaint, ad-
ministrative dispute resolution and litigation.  Why in the world would 
Congress outlaw retaliation, permit employees to benefit from the pro-
tected activity (e.g., charge-filing) of others and then leave the employer 
free to retaliate with impunity against those employee-beneficiaries?  At 
the very least, there is an uncomfortable fit between the restrictive read-
ing of the anti-retaliation provision and the Act’s enforcement provi-
sions.  This supports an argument that the statute is ambiguous on the 
precise issue of whether the anti-retaliation provision protects against 
third-party retaliation. 
Assuming the statute is ambiguous, the case for coverage becomes 
compelling because the manifest purpose of the anti-retaliation provision 
is to maintain “unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.”145  
The “filing of charges and the giving of information by employees” is 
essential to the enforcement of Title VII and “the carrying out of the 
congressional policy embodied in the Act.”146  If an employer was per-
mitted to engage in third-party reprisals with impunity, the employer 
could end run the anti-retaliation provision and subvert the enforcement 
objectives of Title VII.  An employer could discharge workers in retalia-
tion for organized opposition activities, thereby undermining the ability 
of unions or other organizations to wage campaigns against discrimina-
tory practices.  Further, to the extent that the workers had not engaged in 
opposition activity themselves, they would not be protected by the stat-
ute.  Additionally, an employer could adopt a policy of seeking reprisals 
in any case where an employee protested discrimination, filed a charge 
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or otherwise par-
ticipated in the enforcement process.  That policy could require the ter-
mination of any relative, friend, or co-worker of the individual engaging 
in the protected activity.  It makes no sense for Congress to have left 
such a gaping hole in the protections of the anti-retaliation provision. 
The observant reader will note that, at this point, the argument for 
coverage is not unlike the argument one would make under the textual 
end run approach.  The difference is that, under the textual bypass ap-
proach, the party reaches this point of the argument only after first distil-
ling the text and persuading the court that the statutory language is am-
biguous.  The lesson here is obvious.  The end point, in either case, is the 
same.  The question is how to get to that end point in a way that meets 
the demands of the now-prevailing textualist paradigm. 
                                                          
 145. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997). 
 146. Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1005 (5th Cir. 1969). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The shift to a more textualist approach to statutory interpretation 
places new demands on the practitioner.  In prior eras, a party seeking to 
expand the scope of protection under a federal statute could do so with-
out much regard for text; the party could invoke the remedial purpose of 
the statute, talk a lot about the limits of literalism, and argue the case as 
a matter of statutory policy and logic.  The new textualism has changed 
the legal landscape.  Yet, the new textualism may have given back with 
one hand what it has taken with the other. 
This article has attempted to show how one can use textual rhetoric 
to achieve a result that, at first blush, may appear contra-textual.  It con-
structed this argument by using the road map provided by the Supreme 
Court itself.  Textualism may be here to stay, but, within the textualist 
framework, there is a surprising amount of give in the joints.  It is the 
job of the practitioner, seeking to overcome the literal terms of a statute, 
to find that give. 
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